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ABSTRACT 
As an attempt to gain understanding of everything in the global maritime 
environment that can impact the security of the United States, the Maritime Domain 
Awareness initiative is one of the most ambitious projects ever undertaken by the U.S. 
government.  Information that falls under the pervue of MDA is tremendously diverse 
and complex, having application in the regulatory, law enforcement, and military arenas.  
As such, MDA is a multi-agency effort that encompasses 16 respective departments, 
agencies, and organizations working toward one common goal of shared information.  
Given that each of these organizations operates under policies and procedures that are 
radically different, effective MDA requires the design of a construct that fuses multi-
agency information in such a way that it can be effectively shared among all agencies. 
This thesis argues that current infrastructure in the Coast Guard and Navy can be used to 
obtain MDA through a formal linking process that fuses multi-agency information on the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) initiative is one of the largest strategic 
security measures enacted by the U.S. government since the 9/11 attacks.1  Although the 
attacks on 9/11 came from the air, the fact is undeniable that the United States is 
economically (and militarily) dependent upon the sea for livelihood and to project 
national power.2  There is little argument that our maritime infrastructure is vulnerable, 
and that a potential enemy can use the sea to gain access to our nation.  The key to 
defeating this potential threat is knowledge, specifically information that focuses on who 
(or what) is operating in the maritime domain.  MDA is an attempt to gain global 
knowledge of all actions occurring in the maritime domain that can affect the security of 
the United States.  This effort has grown from a Coast Guard/Navy initiative to involve 
16 respective government Agencies and Departments.  Although these groups agree that 
some form of MDA is needed (and, in fact, its implementation has been mandated by 
Presidential direction),3 the actual implementation of MDA is problematic.  Designed as 
an information initiative, how MDA is to be implemented across such a broad agency 
spectrum to unify the diverse capabilities of each remains unclear.  Should MDA rely on 
the infrastructure agencies currently have in place, or the responsibility of an entirely new 
command dedicated to its implementation?  This answer is both illusive and, given the 
number of agencies involved and the wide range of MDA objectives, controversial. 
This thesis argues that use of current infrastructure is the most efficient means to 
obtain MDA, aligning and merging military and civilian capabilities in a logical maritime 
construct toward a common objective.  Fundamental to the success of this model will be 
 
1 The original Maritime Domain Awareness initiative pre-dates 9/11.  Designed as an expansion of the 
Coast Guard’s Special Interest Vessel (SIV) tracking program under Admiral Loy, the initial study 
examined means by which specific vessels could be effectively tracked in the broad approaches to the 
United States.  The attacks on 9/11 moved this program to the immediate forefront of Service priorities for 
the Coast Guard and radically altered the size, scope, and objectives of the program.  Jeffrey High, 
interview by Robert Watts, notation, 25 March 2005, Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington D.C. 
2 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Washington D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, Pre-
Decisional Working Draft, 28 April 05), 3. 
3 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-
13 (Washington D.C: The White House, December 2004), 3. 
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an inter-agency establishment of liaison positions and development of joint fusion centers 
that can act as collection and dissemination points for the vast degree of information 
required for effective MDA.  This will require the drafting of inter-agency agreements, 
the design of a common communication and operational picture, and establishment of a 
common multi-agency information system (COP) on the strategic, regional, and tactical 
levels of MDA. 
Current infrastructure offers a number of advantages to rapid and effective MDA 
implementation.  Although MDA is relatively new, the fundamental concept is not; both 
Navy and Coast Guard, along with a host of maritime intelligence agencies, have been 
practicing some form of ship tracking as part of their operations for years.  Prior to 9/11 
these efforts had a tendency to be focused primarily on specific agency objectives.  Coast 
Guard intelligence, for example, emphasized various types of law enforcement activity, 
while the Navy examined areas of potential military threat.  It is important to note that 
while these efforts were agency specific, the facilities and expertise developed during this 
time period share many common protocols that ease merging into one multi-agency 
MDA construct.  
A survey of current maritime intelligence infrastructure demonstrates that many 
of these facilities were rapidly modified to meet the new threat in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11.  On the tactical level, Coast Guard created a number of new harbor 
operations centers designed to re-direct traditional law enforcement missions toward a 
potential terrorist threat.  This initiative subsequently expanded to include Navy and other 
multi-agency partners working in individual ports, resulting in the creation of a number 
of experimental Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOCs) that are ideal for the tactical 
implementation of MDA.  On the regional/operational level, most DHS and DoD 
agencies created some form of “fusion” center for anti-terrorist intelligence.  The Coast 
Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) established links with many of 
the agencies currently involved in the MDA effort, creating an effective merger of 
military and law enforcement information by both DHS and DoD.  Strategically, the 
Navy’s National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) capitalized on existing protocol 
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with the Coast Guard to provide analysis on worldwide shipping trends and activity that 
had new potential terrorist implications for national security. 
While it is true these efforts in the intelligence and operational communities can 
potentially support MDA, recognizing that this infrastructure exists is not enough.  In 
order for MDA to become a reality, these groups must be linked under one common 
operating protocol to aide in the flow of information between strategic, regional, and 
tactical levels.  This can be accomplished through identifying the best infrastructure on 
each level, then establishing inter-agency cooperation through the use of liaison positions 
and devising common operating procedures.  Critical to this effort will be the design of a 
common operating picture that can electronically link MDA facilities for rapid and 




This thesis’ objective is to provide a logical construct for the use of current 
infrastructure to obtain MDA.  Current infrastructure is by no means the only proposal 
being considered by national planners.  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the term 
“Maritime NORAD” became very popular, evoking images of a coastline controlled by 
various sensors linked to a new command that operated along the same lines as U.S-
Canadian air defense.  The Maritime NORAD solution proposes the creation of such a 
command for MDA, with associated response forces to deal with homeland 
security/homeland defense (HLS/HLD) incidents.  Using a Joint Inter-Agency Task 
Force (JIATF) command, a very popular military solution for dealing with specific 
mission areas, has also been proposed as a solution for achieving MDA.  But MDA’s 
multi-agency and informational (vice operational) nature makes these solutions 
inappropriate.  Although mission focused, another command dedicated to HLS/HLD 
blurs responsibilities between DHS and DoD and requires a complete redesign of the 
current homeland defense infrastructure.  This alternate is neither cost effective nor, 
given the number of commands already in place to perform this mission, practical. 
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As a key component of the National Maritime Strategy, MDA is a vital link to 
homeland security that must be implemented expeditiously and effectively.  Although 
several options exist for its implementation, effective MDA is best accomplished through 
the identification of current infrastructure within DHS and DoD that has experience in the 
maritime domain, then capitalizing on this expertise by designing a fusion construct that 
merges tactical, regional, and strategic structures towards a common goal. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This paper will examine recent innovations by the Coast Guard and Navy 
following the 9/11 attacks and how these innovations can be linked in an MDA construct 
that best leverages the various capabilities of participating agencies vis a vis current 
strategic guidance.  It presents a logical tactical, operational, and strategic construct that 
capitalizes on existing agency strengths linked toward achieving a common objective.  
Although many of the organizations and commands described in this thesis exist today, 
examining how these entities can interact to implement MDA will be largely theoretical 
as, to date, the final form of MDA remains in debate.  The use of current infrastructure 
will be compared with other proposed MDA alternatives, specifically the creation of a 
Maritime NORAD or the formation of a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) 
specifically designed for MDA.   
 
C. TERMS OF REFERENCE 
MDA is a joint interagency effort.  Originally proposed by the Coast Guard, 
MDA has since expanded to become an equal effort between the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD).4 DHS and DOD are, in 
turn, responsible for Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD) 
 
4 The Coast Guard remains the “Lead Federal Agency” (LFA) for MDA.  See Maritime Strategy for 
Homeland Security (Washington D.C: U.S. Coast Guard, July 2002), 1. 
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respectively.5  In the context of HLS/HLD operations it is important to note in this case 
what MDA is not. MDA is not the effort to exercise command and control over forces 
conducting operational missions.  Rather, MDA is the obtaining and dissemination of 
information relative to these mission areas that can subsequently be used by DHS and 
DOD operational forces.  MDA is a force multiplier, bringing together a vast array of 
information that can be disseminated for appropriate action.  MDA provides members of 
the maritime protection community with information, intelligence, and products to 
support their homeland security strategies and subsequent operational decisions.6 
In the classical military definition, it would seem that MDA is nothing more than 
intelligence.  This is true in the sense that intelligence—both military and law 
enforcement—is crucial to the execution of MDA. MDA, however, goes beyond 
traditional intelligence as it considers a far greater pool of information that would not 
normally be considered “intelligence.”  Friendly information, port activity, recreational 
boating, merchant activity, crew lists, manifests, and other peripheral activities in the 
maritime domain are merged with threat information into one comprehensive “picture.” 
This “Common Operating Picture” (COP) can then be used as an enabler for command 
and control.  MDA is very much a “two way street” between the provider of MDA—
defined as some form of fusion and analysis center—and operational units in the field.  
Unlike traditional intelligence which has a tendency to obtain specific (and often stove 
piped) information specific about a singular threat, MDA seeks to fuse data across 
interagency lines in a highly cyclical relationship between operational forces on the 
 
5 Homeland Security (HLS) is defined as “a concentrated national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur.”  Homeland Defense (HLD) is defined as “the protection of U.S. 
sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and 
aggression.” See Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington D.C: Department of 
Defense, Final Coordination Draft, Jan 2005), 10.  While it is not the purpose of this thesis to focus on the 
differences between these missions, it would be fair to say that the vast bulk of maritime security actions—
vessel tracking, boarding, and search—will be considered HLS.  HLD actions are generally confined to a 
very specific, known threat where immediate military (destructive) action is required and are therefore far 
rarer events than day-to-day HLD operations.  MDA is an enabler for both HLS and HLD.  See The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C: Office of Homeland Security, 2002), 2, and 
Strategy for Homeland Defense, 10.  
6 Concept of Operations (CONOPS): Maritime Domain Awareness, Draft 1.29 (Washington D.C: U.S. 
Coast Guard, November 2004), 2. 
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tactical and strategic levels which both feed the COP and take information from it.  This 
element will be examined in detail in following chapters. 
 
D. NOTES ON SOURCES 
The MDA concept is continuously evolving, and in response various agencies 
have generated a number of draft plans, documents and briefings in creating a final MDA 
implementation plan for Presidential signature.  As a Navy Staff planner, the author has 
reviewed most of these plans for official comment by DOD, as well as attended 
numerous senior briefings in the planning process.  Many concepts cited in early planning 
documents were cut from the final plan, not because they were invalid or non-
contributory to MDA, but rather due to the broader scope desired for a final Presidential 
review.7  Since these concepts are valid and will be revisited when the plan’s details are 
worked out, this paper cites various drafts and coordination versions of the original MDA 
plan.  All of the briefings cited in this thesis were attended by the author.  When specific 
briefing personnel are cited, direct questions related to this thesis were asked and the 
briefers advised that their answers would become part of this research.  At no time was 
any classified or sensitive information used in writing this thesis. 
 
E. EXPECTED RESULTS OF THIS THESIS 
At this writing MDA is in a critically formulative phase.  By Presidential 
Directive some form of MDA strategy exists after 1 July 2005.  The exact form this 
MDA system will take and its actual construct has commended and is being developed by 
an officially sanctioned Implementation Team.  It is their work this thesis addresses.  It 
will provide a recommended organizational construct that can be used to successfully 
implement the MDA strategy in a rapid and effective manner, and is intended for 
presentation to the MDA directorate for use in developing the implementation portion of 
the MDA plan. 
 
7 For example, the concept of the Maritime Detection and Interdiction Zone (MDIZ) is central to MDA 
as a layered defense/guide for detection and tracking metrics.  This concept is very much alive in MDA 
operational planning and was cited in the early versions of the National Plan, but was cut from the final 
version as far too tactical for a national level document. 
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II. CURRENT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. WHY MDA? 
Throughout its history the United States has been a global maritime nation, 
dependent upon the oceans for economy, welfare, and defense.  In the modern era 
emphasis on globalization and the world economy has increased this dependence 
considerably.  The numbers representing the sea’s geographic expanse and our reliance 
upon it are illustrative of the vast problem of maritime awareness.  There are some 
95,000 miles of United States’ coastline and 3.4 million square miles of territorial seas 
and exclusive economic zones in the U.S. maritime domain.8  Connecting the continental 
United States to this zone are over 1000 harbors and ports, 361 of which are cargo 
capable.  Through these ports enter approximately 21,000 containers daily, representing 
95 percent of the nation’s overseas cargo, and including 100 percent of our petroleum 
imports.9  In addition to pure commerce, there are 76 million recreational boaters in the 
United States. Six million cruise ship passengers visit U.S. ports annually.10 In the 
strategic/military sense, a substantial portion of U.S. national power relies on the sea, 
both in the form of traditional Navy Carrier Strike groups that deploy from ports in the 
continental United States and the subsequent ability to reinforce deployed forces 
overseas.  Without unimpeded access to the sea, the ability for the United States to 
project national power is limited to what can be airlifted. 
The potential threats associated with the maritime, and especially the coastal, 
environment have always been wide-ranging and diverse, relying on a combination of 
asymmetric offensive tactics while exploiting the variety of the littoral.  This 
vulnerability has been recognized and exploited by enemies in the past.  During the First 
 
8 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington D.C: NSMS Writing Team, Working Draft 
Paper, Feb 2005), 4. 
9 J.Z. Hecker, “Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiative 
Successful,” GAO Publication No. GAO-2-993T (Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting 
Office, August 2002), 3. 
10 National Strategy for Maritime Security, 11. 
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and the Second World War, the coastline of the Untied States was subject to attack from 
enemy submarines, mines, and special operations teams.  The Nazi U-boat offensive 
during the Second World War was particularly effective, destroying over 400 ships in an 
almost completely undefended littoral.11  Defeat of this threat, which caused considerable 
damage to the U.S. war effort, required the aggressive use of intelligence, a dedicated 
surveillance effort, and a coordinated, multi-agency effort to defeat the enemy with non-
traditional methods.12  During the Cold War it was assumed this scenario would repeat 
itself using modern technology, and the coastline of the United States would be subject to 
attack by conventional and unconventional forces of the Soviet Navy targeting 
infrastructure vital to overseas reinforcement and re-supply.  Accordingly, an entirely 
new Coast Guard-Navy command structure—the Maritime Defense Zone—was designed 
to meet the anticipated threat.13 
While these historic coastal defense efforts offer lessons for command and control 
that will subsequently be explored, the asymmetric Global War on Terror (GWOT) threat 
to the nation differs considerably from the Soviet Navy.  The threat is no longer against 
shipping per se, but rather against critical infrastructure, economic and political targets, 
or civilian population centers.  Terrorists do not use conventional weaponry, but rather 
rely on asymmetric methods of attack.  Modern technology has enabled terrorists to 
operate with a greater degree of flexibility worldwide, using sophisticated command and 
control techniques and weaponry.  The probability of a Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) attack by irrational non-state actors using chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear (CBRN) and high yield explosion style weapons has increased substantially in the 
post 9/11 era.14  These weapons’ use would have a devastating impact on our economy 
and national psyche.  In light of GWOT’s asymmetric nature, however, a direct attack 
from the sea is not the only threat that must be considered.  Using the sea to smuggle 
 
11 Michael Gannon, Operation Drumbeat (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), xviii. 
12 J. David Brown, “The Battle of the Atlantic: Peaks and Troughs,” in To Die Gallantly: The Battle of 
the Atlantic (New York: Westview Press, 1992), 144. 
13 R. B. Watts, “Coastal Defense: Now More than Ever” (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Dec 1990), 66. 
14 Sources on WMD are far more numerous after the events of 9/11.  See www.globalsecurity.org/wmd  
(accessed March 5, 2005) for one of the more comprehensive reviews of the threat. 
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weapons, people, illegal drugs and technologies is an age-old problem that takes on new 
dimensions in the Global War on Terror, and many targets that would not be considered 
legitimate (economic, symbolic, etc) in a conventional war now must be considered in 
strategic defensive planning.  In short, the unimpeded use of the sea is a force multiplier 
for a potential enemy dedicated to striking a wide range of potential targets. 
It would be inaccurate to say that prior to the attacks of 9/11 the U.S. maritime 
domain and activity within it were ignored by regulatory and military agencies.  But the 
wide range of potential threats and vulnerabilities in GWOT make it apparent that a 
substantial increase in awareness of the maritime domain is required to ensure the 
homeland’s security and safety.  Calling for an overhaul of our intelligence systems, the 
National Security Strategy is specific in this regard: 
Intelligence must be appropriately integrated with our defense and law 
enforcement systems and coordinated with our allied and friends.  We 
must strengthen intelligence warning and analysis to provide integrated 
threat assessments for national and homeland security.  Since the threats 
inspired by foreign governments and groups may be conducted inside the 
United States, we must also ensure the proper fusion of information 
between intelligence and law enforcement.15 
MDA is an attempt to meet this objective by fusing law enforcement and defense 
intelligence into one useable, interactive information package that focuses on the 
maritime domain.  As such, it will be inter-governmental and global in nature, 
considering all potential threats associated with the sea and providing this information to 
all agencies that can influence maritime security and defense. 
 
B. WHAT IS MDA? 
In many ways, MDA is a process that institutionalizes a fundamental naval 
principle: before an enemy can be engaged, he must first be found.  The problem is as old 
as warfare.  Much of modern naval strategy is based on various means to locate potential 
enemy forces, a problem complicated by the vastness of the maritime environment, the 
huge number of legitimate users, and the wide variety of means by which an enemy can 
exploit the sea to his advantage.  The oceans are complex mediums whose nature 
 
15 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 30. 
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provides ample opportunity for an enemy to avoid detection—weather, sea states, and 
coastal land masses all present considerable challenges to modern sensors.  Peacetime 
economic use of the seas complicate this problem enormously.  The oceans are the 
world’s foremost (and arguably most unregulated) highway, home to a vast and wide 
variety of international “white” (neutral or non-combatant) shipping that possess no 
apparent threat.  Determining who or what is the enemy in such a crowded and complex 
environment is difficult during conventional war.  During an asymmetric conflict such as 
the GWOT, it is almost insurmountable. 
It is the asymmetric nature of GWOT that brings about the crux of MDA.  In 
conventional naval war the enemy is relatively well defined and almost universally a 
combatant.  The GWOT, where literally any vessel could be a potential enemy or weapon 
carrier, or when any maritime event can have an impact on the security of the United 
States, demands a much higher level of awareness than normally exercised in 
conventional naval conflict.  This is recognized by the formal definition of MDA: 
Maritime Domain Awareness is “the effective understanding of anything 
associated with the global maritime environment that could impact the 
security, safety, economy or environment of the United States.  This is 
accomplished through the integration of intelligence, surveillance, 
observation, and navigation systems into one common operating picture 
(COP) that is accessible throughout the U.S. Government.16  
There are several key points in this definition that bear close examination.  Unlike 
traditional naval operations, it is apparent that the goal of MDA is far more than simply 
looking for potential maritime enemies poised to attack the United States.  “Anything 
associated” with the maritime environment that can impact (not necessarily threaten) the 
security, safety, economy or environment goes far beyond what many would envision as 
a classic maritime threat.  These include smuggling of people or dangerous cargoes, 




16  National Security Presidential Directive 41 (Washington D.C.: The White House, December 2004), 
13. 
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protection of critical maritime infrastructure, oil spills, weather, and environmental 
concerns among other events. These elements and a host of others must be considered to 
achieve true MDA.17  
Maritime events that could potentially impact the United States are not the only 
wide-ranging element of MDA.  HSPD 13 requires that threats be identified as early and 
far from our shores as possible.  Because of this requirement, MDA is not a homeland 
centric process; rather, it is global in nature.  Because of the potential impact to homeland 
security, activities occurring overseas and in foreign ports are very much a part of MDA.  
For example, if a cargo is loaded in Singapore and its ultimate destination is the United 
States (via several other international ports), the loading, transport, security, and all 
matters associated with that container would be part of MDA.  MDA must therefore be 
exercised over all oceans worldwide, and potentially cover all maritime interests that 
ultimately deal with the United States. 
The range of potential security challenges and enormous geographic area 
represented by the maritime domain makes achieving anything close to effective MDA a 
huge undertaking.  This was recognized early in planning for its implementation.  MDA 
was originally conceived as a Coast Guard concept in the late 1990s to track various 
“Special Interest Vessels” globally.  After 9/11, it was realized that this application could 
be expanded to include all actions in the maritime domain of potential threat to the 
United States.18  Although the Coast Guard was the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for 
MDA, it was never conceived as a Coast Guard centric program.  Early in the concept 
development process Coast Guard leadership formed a strong partnership with the Navy 
in planning and use of assets.  During an “MDA Summit” held at the Secretary level in 
May 2004, Mr. Paul McHale (Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense) and 
Admiral James Loy (Deputy Secretary Homeland Security), with the concurrence of 
Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Ridge, brought together senior members of 16 
respective Departments and Agencies involved in some degree with the maritime domain.  
The ultimate goal was to devise a plan for these agencies to work together for both 
 
17 CONOPS, 1. 
18 High interview, 25 March 2005. 
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implementation and continued execution of MDA.  The stated goal of this summit was to 
coordinate a compilation of diverse information into one common, usable format that 
could be accessed by all the agencies involved in the maritime domain.19 Ultimately 
these Agencies formed a Senior Steering Group (SSG) specifically to accomplish these 
objectives through the drafting of the MDA Strategy. 
These agencies possess a wide range of operational and intelligence capabilities 
that require some degree of fusion under the over-arching goal of MDA.  Fusion is of 
these capabilities is key.  The overall goal of MDA is noble, but extremely ambitious.  
For true MDA to be achieved, a process has to be defined which best leverage the various 
multi-agency capabilities that are able to contribute to that process.  These actual 
mechanics of MDA are based heavily on established naval principles for maritime 
surveillance.  
 
C. MDA: THE MECHANICS 
Effective MDA is more than simply agreeing that various government agencies 
will cooperate in ocean surveillance.  It is a process that attempts through a broad 
awareness to properly identify threats for appropriate action.  As such, MDA borrows 
heavily from established naval principles and previously established coastal defense 
models.  In traditional naval combat, a threat must first be detected, localized, classified 
and targeted before it can be effectively engaged. Although many factors are considered 
in MDA, its core process is ultimately the monitoring of vessels and the vessels’ cargo, 
crews, and passengers to rapidly generate geo-locating information on vessels of interest. 
This is an analytical process that includes tracking, data base searches for unknown 





19 Statement of Mr. Jeffrey High on the U.S. Coast Guard’s MDA Efforts before the Subcommittee on 
Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
Representatives (www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/10-06-04/high.pdf, October 2004, accessed 
September 10, 2005), 5. 
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tracking of vessels.  This tracking process is comprised of five components designed to 
narrow a wide area surveillance to an area of tactical dimension where threats can be 
identified and isolated:20  
 
• Surveil.  Maritime surveillance is the observation of activity in all areas 
and environments within the Area of Interest (AOI) or Area or 
Responsibility (AOR).  It is multi-dimensional, including aerospace, 
land, sea surface, and undersea environments.   
• Detect.  Detection is dependent upon the capability and employment of 
sensors and/or intelligence. Detection of maritime activity or potential 
threats is the first indication that some form of response or defensive 
action is required.  Specific intelligence may direct sensors to concentrate 
in an area to detect a particular Target of Interest (TOI).   
• Track.  Tracking is the display or recording of the successive positions 
of a moving object.  Tracking must be maintained to allow decision 
makers to achieve an end result that is mission and situation specific, 
including doing nothing, monitoring, interdicting, or eliminating the 
threat or challenge. 
• Classify and Identify.  Classification and Identification is the 
determination of a characteristic or set of characteristics that uniquely 
differentiates a particular vessel, target, or event from others in the same 
classification category.  This information is often correlated through the 
use intelligence, analysis and information databases.   
 
• Target.  Targeting involves interpreting detection and identification 
information fused with intelligence to sort vessel intentions and determine 
risk.  Targeting involves evaluating detected vessels and determining 
which possess unresolved risk from activity, intelligence, and anomalous 
behavior. 
 
This process is illustrated in Figure 121 below: 
 
 
20 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Maritime Domain Awareness, Version 1.28 (Washington 
D.C: U.S. Coast Guard, 30 September 2004), 6. 
21 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.   MDA Tracking Process 
 
MDA’s core is applying the vessel tracking process to a layered defense model 
centered on the coastline of the United States, the ultimate goal of which is to detect 
potential threats early and as far away from the U.S. coastline as possible.  Layered 
defense is a classic navy tactic applied to battle group operations to protect a “high value 
unit” (HVU) such as an aircraft carrier.  In the past this layered defense model has been 
applied to coastal defense for conventional conflict.  In that particular case, the “high 
value unit” is generally considered the port or facility vital for military operations.22  
There are key differences, however, in the layered defense used in the classic military 
model and MDA.  As there is no single high value unit per se, MDA “layers” are 
expanded to include an entire coastline with the overall goal of coordinated surveillance.  
Not all areas in these “layers” are considered equally, but rather additional attention is 
given to areas that are potential targets for our terrorist enemy.  
Layered defense in MDA terms is represented by a Maritime Detection and 
Identification Zone (MDIZ).  The MDIZ places a high degree of emphasis on timeliness 
of detection and tracking of ALL vessels.  Since the threat is asymmetric and often 
uncertain all vessels are subject to the surveillance process, requiring an improved 
timeliness of tracking as vessels get closer to U.S. waters (Figure 2).23 
                                                 
22 R.B.Watts, “Defending Our Shores” (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Oct 1987), 42. 
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execute a response for each target class.
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Figure 2.   MDIZ 
 
The 2000nm limit of the proposed MDIZ is based on the recently legislated 96 
hour notification requirement for foreign vessels entering U.S. ports.  A vessel traveling 
20kts will arrive at its destination in roughly 96 hours.24  As shown in Figure 2, the 
MDIZ’s goal is to gather more timely information on the vessel as it approaches closer to 
the U.S. coast.  When entering the MDIZ, positions every four hours are the norm while 
in territorial sea the goal is to obtain positional data every 3 minutes, recognizing that as a 
vessel gets closer to a potential target the greater potential threat it represents. 
                                                 
24 The 96 hour notification requirement was mandated by the Coast Guard in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks.  Note, however, that this is only a requirement for vessels entering U.S. ports, not vessels engaged 
in innocent passage.  The MDIZ is not in any way a regulatory zone, but rather intended as a guideline for 
detection parameters.  Ibid., 7. 
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MDA’s objective is to create a continuous awareness that utilizes a layered 
defense model to identify potential maritime threat.  But how can it be implemented?  In 
theory, all maritime activity will be tracked within the MDIZ for potential response.  As 
noted in the projected requirements, however, MDA’s actual practice is complex.  Who 
will execute the surveillance process or monitor activity in the MDIZ in the multi-agency 
environment is unclear, especially given the wide range of capabilities that apply in the 
maritime domain. Although the concept of MDA as information is clear, how this 
information will be collected, analyzed, and disseminated or who will maintain overall 
authority over the MDA remains to be developed.  These and other questions require a 
defined organizational construct that reaches across the three levels of MDA execution: 


























                                                
III. MDA ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT 
MDA’s core objective is obtaining awareness through a layered defense.  On the 
surface, the solution to this problem would seem fairly straightforward. As we have 
divided the ocean into various “zones,” simply assigning a large number of various 
sensors to these zones would seem to solve the problem of overall surveillance and vessel 
tracking.25  Unfortunately, the problem is far more complex.  While there are many 
potential systems that could provide a high degree of surveillance and tracking data, the 
actual fusion of this data remains problematic.  Information that cannot be correlated and 
analyzed is simply information for information’s sake.  In order to derive a 
comprehensive MDA picture, information must be fused, correlated, and analyzed.  This 
requires an organizational construct.   
It is obvious from examining the theoretical MDIZ that MDA, and the subsequent 
organizational architecture that will execute it, must be approached from a number of 
levels.  While a port command may exercise excellent tactical control within its sphere of 
influence, for example, this is naturally limited by available sensors, forces, and 
geography, so events occurring 2000nm offshore are all but invisible.  Similarly, a port’s 
day-to-day operations will be largely invisible to a command center dedicated to 
coordinating fleet movements in ocean areas or worldwide.  Both are arguably part of 
MDA, demonstrating the need for a logical division of labor to coordinate all levels into 
one comprehensive picture. 
In traditional military theory, warfare is conducted on 3 respective levels: Tactical 
(operations of individual or small groups of forces), Regional/Operational (operations of 
large groups of forces or fleets), and Strategic (operations on a theater or national 
level).26  To be effective an MDA organization must be designed to operate on each of 
 
25 In experiments conducted by the Coast Guard in coastal maritime surveillance, it was found the 
addition of multiple sensors actually complicated the MDA problem enormously.  Without fusion, 
correlation and analysis of sensor information each track had to be individually verified, a tremendous 
drain on operational resources.  Fusion of data attempts to limit this trend by detection of anomalies.  
“Fusion and MDA Systems,” ONR brief to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 31 March 05. 
26 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington 
D.C., Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001), 419, 311, 406. 
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these levels in different ways that remain linked to provide one overall comprehensive 
picture.  On the tactical level, MDA supports on-scene decision makers and focuses on 
tracking an immediate threat.  Day-to-day operations in ports and activities immediately 
offshore become the focal point at this level.  On the regional level, MDA information is 
analyzed within the context of activities along an entire coast, while the strategic level 
focuses on activities overseas and uses information obtained from the tactical and 
regional levels to conduct long term planning or tactical and operational activities against 
specific threats overseas.27 Each level is crucial to overall MDA and will be examined in 
turn. 
 
A. TACTICAL MDA 
It is a fundamental theory of DHS that effective homeland security is conducted 
on a local or tactical level.  Much of the HLS effort subsequently focuses on local 
operational forces and first responders.28  Through the vigilance of law enforcement, it is 
here that a potential threat is often initially detected and neutralized.  In terms of HLS 
MDA, the tactical level focuses on ports and the maritime “approaches” to the United 
States—in this case defined as 30-40 miles offshore.29  While these zones have always 
been high areas of focus for maritime security operations, post 9/11 these operations have 
changed considerably as a result of Coast Guard and Navy response to an asymmetric 
terrorist threat.  An examination of this change is crucial for an understanding of tactical 
MDA. 
Prior to 9/11 the Coast Guard port and offshore tactical construct was divided into 
two separate areas of responsibility.  In major ports the traditional “Captain of the Port” 
(COTP) position was assigned to a respective Marine Safety Offices (MSOs) responsible 
 
27 National Plan to Improve MDA, First Coordination Draft, March 2005, 5. 
28 This underlying assumption has been key to a number of DHS decisions, including President Bush’s 
nomination of NYPD Police Commissioner Kerik to lead the Dept.  See “All Homeland Security is Local,” 
Slate, Dec 3, 2004, accessed February 19, 2005. 
29 The actual definition of “approaches” varies considerably.  To date, there is no standard definition 
in Joint or Service doctrine; in operational planning, however, it is generally considered that “approaches” 
in the tactical sense is defined as the effective operating range of sensors and response capability of tactical 
assets.  See “Technology Working Group Briefing, MDA.” USCG Innovation Expo, San Diego CA, 2 May 
2005. 
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for regulatory functions, such as vessel inspection, environmental response, licensing, 
etc.  COTPs were (and are) responsible for merchant vessels entering and leaving port, 
coordinating vessel inspections for maritime safety, and coordinating incident response.  
Maritime law enforcement conducted by MSOs was distinctly regulatory in nature—
many vessel inspectors and recreational boating safety personnel performed their duties 
unarmed.  Operations of a more traditional, law enforcement variety, such as counter-
narcotics or fisheries enforcement, search and rescue and other offshore operations were 
the responsibility of a “Group” that maintained command and control of subordinate 
“Stations” in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) assigned that Group.30  While this 
description is admittedly overly simplistic, it would be fair to say that MSOs “owned” the 
ports and all responsibilities for large merchant vessel and container operations that 
traditionally required regulatory attention, while Groups focused offshore and conducted 
law enforcement operations dealing with smaller maritime traffic or search and rescue.  
Afloat operational assets (utility boats, patrol boats, and small cutters) were generally 
“owned” by the groups and used offshore in traditional law enforcement, although there 
was limited cooperation with the MSO for close inshore operations that required these 
assets.31 
While this relationship and division of responsibility made sense prior to 9/11, the 
new asymmetric threat altered the equation considerably, requiring a merging of 
traditional responsibilities across established lines of command.  The expanded threat 
spectrum now reached directly into the ports.  Pure regulation, although still important 
for security, no longer sufficed. A direct law enforcement response capability 
(traditionally the role of Groups) was now required in the ports.  Alternatively, tracking 
and intercept of large merchant vessels, traditionally an MSO function, took on a new 
 
30 The composition of Groups varies considerably.  Traditionally, Groups were composed of a 
command center and had direct control of a number of smaller afloat assets, such as patrol boats and buoy 
tenders, and occasionally were co-located with air stations and controlled the helicopters/planes assigned to 
that station.  “Stations” were smaller CG commands that maintained small offshore utility boats for near 
coastal SAR and law enforcement.  Author’s operational experience.  See also P.J. Capelotti, “The Coast 
Guard’s Response to 9/11,” Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned, Vol VI, Issue 4, 
September 2004. 
31 Each Group/MSO had individual Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that detailed this 
relationship, which varied in individual ports.  The characterization/summary of these relationships is based 
on the author’s operational experience. 
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meaning as these vessels potentially represent a threat to the security of the United States.  
Subsequently, merchant vessel regulation focusing on maritime security was “pushed” far 
offshore with the establishment of a layered defense.32  The new threat also affected other 
agencies with maritime security concerns.  Ports with high Navy interest such as Navy 
bases, research facilities, critical infrastructure, and out load responsibilities augmented 
traditional security with extensive anti-terrorist force protection (ATFP) procedures to 
prevent, among other things, a “USS COLE” style attack on potentially vulnerable 
warships.  U.S. Customs immediately implemented increased forms of container and 
cargo security measures that were completely lacking prior to 9/11.  These new multi-
agency security requirements demand revamping the traditional dual track and somewhat 
laissez-faire command system exercised in U.S. ports prior to 9/11 will no longer suffice. 
Internally, the Coast Guard’s response to the new threat was a merging of 
responsibility under a newly designed “Sector” organization, an effective combination of 
MSO and Group responsibilities and assets.  The Sector has sole responsibility for all 
Coast Guard missions in one geographic area.33  This significant re-organization was an 
important first step within the Coast Guard that soon took on a multi-agency nature.  The 
Coast Guard reinforced traditional close ties to other port agencies in the design of  
Sector Command Centers (SCCs) that included multiple organizations.  The link to DOD 
was made through a specialized SCC called the Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC), 
an experimental fusion center that quickly demonstrated its utility in providing tactical 
MDA.34  Recognizing a mutually beneficial interest in coordinating operations, the first 
JHOCs focused on fusing Coast Guard and Navy operations in port protection and ATFP 
 
32 Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C: U.S. Coast Guard, July 2002). 
33Where applicable, Sector organizations also include Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and CG Air 
Stations. CONOPS tab a, a-5-a-1. 
34 Note that the term “JHOC” is technically not accurate.  At the time of this writing, Sector Command 
Centers (SCCs) with USN participation are designated “SCC-J” (Joint)—the term JHOC, however, is 
widely recognized in DOD and will likely to remain in the lexicon for some time.  For this reason, JHOC 
and SCC-Js will remain synonymous throughout this paper.  Additionally, many SCCs are not designed 
with a Navy component, yet still link with other agencies involved in MDA.  For this reason, the current 
infrastructure model considers all SCC types tactical components of MDA. See Dana Goward, 
“Unclassified Briefing to Maritime Security Integration Group (MSIG),” Pentagon, Feb 28, 2005. 
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where the Navy had a large fleet presence.35  Given their multi-agency approach to port 
security and littoral operations, JHOCs are a natural choice for the implementation of 
tactical MDA.            
JHOCs are far more than a merging of CG traditional roles and responsibilities 
with USN security procedures.  Coast Guard and Navy cooperation is neither new nor 
particularly unique.  Since the earliest days of each organization, both have used similar 
equipment and procedures in order to effectively operate together during time of war.  
But despite overseas operations in GWOT, U.S. ports are not on a war footing.  Rather, 
commerce and port operations continue at the normal pace, albeit under increased 
security procedures. Recognizing the number of agencies that operate in ports and the 
vast information requirements to obtain true MDA, an effort was made to make JHOCs 
truly inter-agency by providing linkage to these agencies, including the establishment of 
formal liaison positions and data sharing protocol, with the goal to merge regulation, law 
enforcement, and anti-terrorist force protection data and procedures.       
The first experimental JHOCs were constructed and successfully tested in San 
Diego and Norfolk, ports that represented high strategic interest due to major Navy 
presence and the volume of overseas commercial traffic.  These JHOC’s multi-agency 
design was based on previously established relationships the Coast Guard had established 
during its normal operations within each port.  This is illustrated in Figure 3 below:36 
 
35 It is important to note that at the time of this writing DOD participation in JHOCs are limited to 
ATFP, so USN presence in JHOCs are currently limited to areas of fleet or asset concentration.  “JHOC 
Working Group Meeting/Briefing to Maritime Security Integration Group”, Pentagon, 22 June 2005.  It is a 
core recommendation of this thesis that this participation be expanded to include MDA. 
36 “Pacific Area Capabilities and Interoperability for Homeland Security/Homeland Defense,” 
(Alameda: Unclassified briefing to Honorable Paul McHale, December 14,, 2004). 
 




Figure 3.   Sector Command Center Structure 
 
JHOCs possess several unique capabilities that contribute significantly to tactical 
MDA.  As command and control centers for ports and their immediate vicinity, JHOCs 
have inherent surveillance capability that can contribute to a COP.  Using the San Diego 
JHOC as an example, these systems these include: 
    --USCG Coastal Radar 
    --USN Port control/offshore radar system 
    --Automated Identification System processors 
    --San Diego port control camera system (civilian) 
    --Navy waterside security system 
    --Border patrol camera/thermal imagery system 
JHOCs can serve as the critical fusion point for various intelligence data bases of 
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Maritime Information Safety and Law Enforcement system, the Automated Regional 
Justice Information System (Naval Criminal Investigative Service), and intelligence from 
the local Joint Terrorism Task Force.37  Through the use of inter-agency sensors and local 
inter-agency liaison, the JHOC effectively collects, fuses, and disseminates information 
that is critical for achieving tactical MDA. 
Although there are only two fully functional JHOCs today, their developing 
construct serves as a model for a future development.  This is especially true in the area 
of multi-agency liaison.  In addition to acting as a fusion center for multiple data bases 
and intelligence, one of the great advantages of a JHOC structure is its joint personnel 
structure.  Although primarily manned by Coast Guard personnel, billets are established 
from all agencies that have port responsibility, representing a unique merger of personnel 
with regulatory, law enforcement, and military expertise.38  This liaison system is 
fundamental to the success of tactical MDA not only for coordination of operations, but 
also to reach an understanding of multi-agency procedures and practices.  Given the large 
number of regulatory agencies operating in each port, there are a number of procedures 
specific to each agency that can have critical impact on other multi-agency operations.  
Customs container inspections, for example, is a critical part of vessel tracking and re-
routing performed by the Coast Guard; FBI tracking of potential terrorist suspects a key 
element of ATFP for the Navy and facilities security forces. This type of information, and 
perhaps more importantly, how these procedures are carried out can be provided 
immediately by effective liaison that effectively merges different agency operations into 
one efficient cooperative effort. 




37 Goward, MSIG brief, Pentagon, 28 Feb 2004. 






Figure 4.   JHOC/COP 
 
Figure 4 above illustrates the number of potential agencies or groups that can contribute 
directly to a JHOC and share in the Common Operational Picture (COP) to achieve 
tactical MDA 
 
JHOC San Diego’s and Norfolk’s initial successes led to a joint Coast Guard-
Navy study to expand the project to other ports of strategic interest.  Ports with Navy 
presence, high commercial infrastructure, and ‘outload’ capability (loading of wartime 
material and supplies critical for overseas efforts) were considered for JHOC 
installation.39  Today there are 6 high priority ports being upgraded to JHOC status, and 
approximately 17 SCCs that are being considered for some form of future upgrade for 
USCG-USN integration.  
Multi-agency JHOCs offer several advantages for the effective implementation of 
tactical MDA.  In the post 9/11 construct, JHOCs and SCCs were initially designed as 
natural combinations of port command and control activity operating outside of the realm 
of tactical MDA.  But seen as part of the greater picture, their application to MDA is 
                                                 










                                                
obvious.  By acting as combined, multi-agency fusion centers they provide a unique 
tactical picture that all MDA users can employ at the port level.  This increased multi-
agency awareness provides for streamlined operations between all port agencies, while 
the use of multi-agency sensors and data bases allows for a tremendously enhanced 
capability for surveillance and anomaly detection.  Additionally, the critical fusion 
function performed by the JHOCs allows tactical information to be entered into a COP 
that can be accessed by MDA users in the regional and strategic spheres, the first step in 
obtaining a larger, regional picture and ultimately achieving strategic MDA. 
       
 
B. REGIONAL/OPERATIONAL MDA 
Joint inter-operability at the tactical level is an important first step in obtaining 
MDA, but by itself cannot obtain the overall goal of global maritime awareness.  Tactical 
homeland security quite rightly centers on the ports and their immediate approaches.  To 
achieve MDA, this information must be viewed as part of an overall whole, not only to 
ensure proper coordination between assets, but also to extend the “reach” of domain 
awareness to detect potential threats as far from the homeland as possible.  This is 
MDA’s role on the operational or regional level. 
The operational/regional level of coordination is generally considered to occur at 
a “fleet” or “agency” level—in terms of the Coast Guard or Navy, for example, this 
focuses on District/Area command, or Fleet commander level respectively.  FBI, 
Customs, and other DHS agencies all have roughly equivalent layers of command or 
bureaucracy that coordinates tactical or field operations at this level.  In response to the 
9/11 attacks, many intelligence watches or fusion centers were “stood up” to coordinate 
the new requirements of GWOT and homeland security adding to intelligence centers 
already in existence that refocused their efforts toward the terrorist threat.  The purpose, 
function, and focus of these various fusion centers vary considerably.  Designed to meet 
the need of their parent organizations, most formed using compartmentized information 
and procedures.40   In the maritime arena, these centers/groups include, but are not 
 
40 Mark Stevens, “As Is” National Maritime Domain Protection System (Monterey: Maritime Domain 
Protection Research Group, November 2004), 28. 
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limited too, Fleet/ Combatant Commander (COCOM) Staff N2s (intelligence), Joint 
Inter-Agency Task Force components, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) 
offices, Coast Guard District Intelligence, and Custom Border Patrol (CBP) offices, and 
Federal Law Enforcement centers.   
While each group possesses their own unique area of focus and expertise, none is 
exclusively directed specifically toward MDA.  As the lead federal agency for MDA 
implementation, it follows that the Coast Guard should be the agency to bring these 
groups together in one fusion center/COP specifically for MDA.  As the JHOC did on the 
tactical level, the Coast Guard can perform this function with infrastructure currently in 
place, using the newly created Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, or MIFCs. 
MIFCs were created specifically to deal with the increased intelligence 
requirements of the maritime homeland security mission.  Organizationally, Coast Guard 
operational forces on each coast are commanded by a CG fleet commander equivalent, 
Coast Guard Atlantic Area (CGLANTAREA) in the Atlantic and Coast Guard Pacific 
Area (CGPACAREA) in the Pacific.  Prior to 9/11 these commands linked with various 
Navy and law enforcement intelligence agencies to provide specialized forms of 
intelligence (military, counter-narcotics, etc) for use by operational forces.  While this 
intelligence was used for strategic and operational purposes, this was generally focused 
on traditional USCG law enforcement missions.  The counter-terror missions required 
post 9/11 increased these intelligence requirements exponentially, necessitating the 
creation of MIFCs at each Coast Guard Area to provide direct intelligence support to the 
Area Commander, specifically to deal with operational intelligence and coordination of 
MDA-like activities.     
MIFCs are far more than staffs.  Possessing over 50 intelligence specialists and 
analysts, MIFCs collect, analyze and disseminate operational intelligence, both to tactical 
units in the field and strategic fusion centers up the chain of command.  MIFCs have 
access to national intelligence, law enforcement intelligence, and subject matter experts 
in the intelligence community.  In addition to providing intelligence analysis, MIFCs are 
capable of deploying experts, equipment, and sensors to support tactical operations when 
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required. 41  In their formal charter, MIFCs focus on regional homeland security, migrant 
interdiction, counter-drug operations, defense readiness, living marine resources (LMR) 
enforcement, and search and rescue—all components of MDA.42 
MIFCs serve as a collection point for tactical intelligence, but also provide a key 
analytical function that is lacking at the tactical level.  This is a critical point; although 
JHOCs certainly provide a low level of analysis on local information, this is by necessity 
extremely tactical and very limited, as there are no personnel specifically dedicated to the 
analytical role.  By its regional nature and access to a broad amount of information from 
tactical and strategic sources, MIFCs have the ability to support  tactical operations and 
piece together parts of an overall intelligence picture.  Dedicated personnel at MIFCs 
perform both short and long term analysis that is critical for planning and response.  
Through its connection to tactical and strategic levels of command, the MIFC can provide 
product both up and down the chain of command for immediate tactical use as well as 
further strategic analysis.  Specifically, this regional analysis focuses in the following 
areas: 
--Collection/Ops Management: MIFCs act as a focal point for collection of field 
intelligence, not only from operational Coast Guard units but also multi-agency partners 
operating in ports in the AOR. 
--ELINT fusion: MIFCs possess an electronic intelligence component that collects 
and fuses electronic information to supplement other intelligence sources.   
--Combatant Commander Level: As a COCOM level unit, MIFCs liaison with 
local USN fleet commanders to share maritime intelligence, fusing this information in 
one common product. 
--Coordinated Operational Intelligence Production: MIFCs produce a number of 




41 Stevens, “As Is” National Maritime Domain Protection System, 21. 
42 “Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Capabilities and Operations,” Briefing to author, Dec 2004. 
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intelligence summaries, ATFP reports, Alerts/Advisories, and management of a common 
intelligence picture), and operational/strategic reports and analysis based on input from 
the field.43 
These analytical functions represent the first real step from local, responsive 
tactical MDA to a broader effort to obtain a wider area picture, and begin the trend 
analysis that is vital for overall awareness and anomaly detection.  
Although designed and staffed by the Coast Guard, MIFCs exercise a “joint” 
nature that is particularly valuable for an MDA construct.  MIFCs were designed 
specifically to fuse and analyze the vast amount of joint and multi-agency information 
and intelligence that affects the maritime domain. To link directly with Navy activities, 
MIFCs are co-located with Navy Shipping Coordination Centers (NSCCs).  Originally 
designed to warn Navy ships of merchant ship activity that might interfere with ongoing 
operations, NSCC now provides information to MIFCs that allow them to identify 
shipping anomalies or suspicious commercial vessel activity.  In addition, MIFCs have 
established interagency liaisons with the Immigrations Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
Customs Border Patrol (CBP), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), USN COCOMs, and strategic intelligence sources.  Using the unique 
Coast Guard’s dual law enforcement/military nature of the CG, MIFCs serve as a 
collection, fusion, and analysis point for both law enforcement and military intelligence 
data.44 
 










43 “Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Capabilities and Operations,” Briefing to author, Dec 2004. 
44 The sharing of law enforcement and military intelligence is not universal; due to restrictions 
imposed by U.S. law, the types of information that can be fused in these two areas that are available to all 
agencies is limited.  See appendix 2. 
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PACAREA MIFC Intelligence Partners:45 
• LAW ENFORCMENT  DOD/INTELLIGENCE CENTERS 
 Department of Homeland Security NORTHCOM Intelligence Watch 
 “Legacy” Customs, ICE/CBP Intelligence Coordination Center (USCG) 
 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) MIFC Atlantic 
 Coast Guard Investigative Services National Maritime Intelligence Center 
  Air Marine Operations Center Joint Intelligence Center Pacific 
 California Anti-Terrorism Info Ctr Commander Third Fleet Battle Watch 
 El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific  
 Royal Canadian Mounted Police NOPF Whidbey Island  
 Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South Defense Intelligence Agency/JIFT-CT 
 Coast Guard Operational Cmds National Security Agency  
   CIA/Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
 
The wide range of maritime intelligence available to the MIFCs for both tactical 
dissemination and operational analysis make then a natural fusion point for 
regional/operational level MDA.  As regional commands they can be key interface 









45 Goward, MIFC brief, Pentagon, Feb 28, 2005. 





Figure 5.   MFIC 
 
 
MIFCs are not the only regional command center that focuses on maritime 
intelligence.  As noted, most agencies maintain some form of regional operations center, 
as do applicable COCOMs.  But these centers are naturally focused in their individual 
areas of expertise, whereas the inherent design of MIFCs was intended to be multi-
agency in nature.  The Coast Guard’s unique position vis a vis DOD and DHS is also an 
important factor. As a military service the Coast Guard maintains the same equipment 
and reporting procedures as DOD, while their Title 14 (law enforcement) authority 
provides a natural link to other law enforcement and civilian regulatory maritime 
agencies.  This “dual hatted” nature, as well as a long standing familiarity with the area of 
operations, make MIFCs a natural choice to be the fusion point for regional MDA. 
Like all elements of MDA, fundamental to the success of MIFCs will be the 
development of a multi-agency electronic COP and the establishment of multi-agency 
liaison officer positions at each MIFC.  This liaison element is especially important on 
the regional level.  While tactical operations at JHOCs will rely on established local 
relationships, decisions and analysis on the MIFC level require in-depth knowledge of 
policies and procedures from all participating agencies.  MIFCs are the first analytical 
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level of MDA, and as such require considerable cooperation across agency lines to ensure 
comprehensive analysis is conducted.  Manning MIFCs with appropriate level inter-
agency subject matter experts is therefore critical for a comprehensive regional picture 
that can be shared with both JHOCs on the tactical level, and national decision makers on 
the strategic level of MDA. 
 
C. STRATEGIC MDA 
Traditionally strategy drives doctrine, procurement and ultimately field 
operations.  Ideally, all levels of the command or organization are responsible for 
executing some part of the strategy, while providing lessons learned which can be used to 
modify the strategy accordingly.  Strategy sets the course for the organization and the 
operations that follow, and as such is critically important for overall success.  On the 
national level, strategy is critical for long term planning, operational insight, and 
providing national decision makers with support to establish priorities, determine agency 
strategies, allocate national resources, and determine level of overall maritime threat.46    
This is a difficult process during normal peacetime operations and is particularly 
challenging in the constantly changing asymmetric maritime environment that MDA is 
designed to address. 
MDA’s ultimate goal is to obtain a sense of global awareness that reaches beyond 
the confines of the tactical and regional levels.  Were MDA simply a defensive strategy 
against a known military or terrorist threat, it could arguably be obtained simply by 
forming defensive layers around the United States.  But as an informational/awareness 
system, its goals are far broader, seeking to understand all potential maritime threats to 
the homeland, many of which could originate overseas in the most innocuous of manners. 
It is the obtaining of vital bits of information and piecing together the puzzle that true 
MDA is achieved, and this requires a global outlook.  Global maritime awareness is the 
core of MDA and is widely recognized in a number of national strategies that deal with 
the terrorist threat.  These include the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the 
National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the 
 
46 National Plan to Improve Maritime Domain Awareness, 5. 
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National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.47   These strategies rely on 
MDA as both an enabler and force multiplier to their individual core objectives.  Without 
an implemented strategic MDA, many of the basic tenets of these strategies will remain 
unfulfilled and unobtainable. 
Obtaining true global and strategic awareness is one of the most difficult 
objectives of MDA.  While linking tactical and operational MDA capabilities can 
effectively provide a picture of ports and much of the mid-ocean regions, this is 
decidedly homeland centric and far more operational in scope than a global or strategic 
picture.  Strategic MDA requires a detailed multi-agency linkage on a level that is far 
more complex than the simple linking of JHOCs and MIFCs.  The size and scale of this 
effort is problematic.  MDA is unique among government programs in that it is truly 
multi-agency, its scope reaching far beyond normal bureaucratic experience. Strategic 
MDA requires the realignment of bureaucracy and the re-tasking of national assets 
toward the overall goal of global awareness.  This requires a huge cultural change that 
presents a host of new difficulties, not the least of which is the requirement for a large 
number of civilian and military agencies with entirely different policies and procedures to 
cooperate together more clearly than they ever have before, toward one common goal. 
Strategic MDA requires a broad perspective and capabilities at the highest levels 
of analysis, intelligence, and policy.  Since strategy and overseas operations are 
inherently a function of the military services, it would seem that this is the first place to 
look for appropriate lessons and models that can be applied to MDA.  Strategic level 
planning is a long established function of the military services, which routinely conduct 
strategic level analysis for operational and campaign planning.  All branches of the 
military and most government agencies maintain some form of strategic center for senior 
officers and analysts to compile and act on strategic level information in this regard.  In 
recent times, the advent of “net-centric” systems that allow strategic planners almost live 
feed from operational units have increased the utility—and complexity—of these centers 
considerably.  
 
47 National Plan to Improve Maritime Domain Awareness, 4. 
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From the strictly military perspective, strategic command centers are inherent to 
all services, and it would seem that such centers would be tailor made for the 
implementation of MDA.  But MDA brings with it several unique challenges that 
challenge this assumption.  Most military command centers are defense specific, focusing 
on military command systems and operations.  Government and law enforcement 
agencies, while similar in many respects, do not exercise the same procedures.48 The 
unique multi-agency nature of MDA requires that any center quantifying strategic MDA 
must not only focus on strategic maritime issues but also have the ability to link and 
liaison with participating agencies in both DOD and DHS at a strategic level. The very 
nature of the global maritime environment requires that this center be integrated cross-
government, possessing the ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate data from a wide 
variety of tremendously diverse sources, including DOD, law enforcement, DHS, 
Department of State, Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce, private 
industry, etc.  Additionally—and this is a key distinction—it must be recalled that MDA 
is ultimately about awareness, not the operational direction of forces.  A center focused 
on strategic MDA must act as an enabler for organizations by obtaining this awareness, 
not a controller for military or law enforcement operations. 
A center for strategic MDA must have experience in multi-agency operations and 
procedures that can transcend the gap between the military, law enforcement, and 
regulatory agencies that are part of MDA. In the maritime arena, this is possible through 
expansion of existing infrastructure, specifically developing such a fusion/analysis point 
at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).  NMIC was designed as a unique 
multi-agency approach to general maritime intelligence, housing the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI), the Coast Guard’s Information Coordination Center (ICC), and 
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).  Additionally, NMIC has active liaison and 
interface with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), CBP, ICE and other DHS agencies 
with interest in the maritime domain.49  Through this initial design many of the 
 
48 Gregory Treverton, “Intelligence: Welcome to the U.S. Government,” in Loch K. Johnson and 
James J. Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 2004), 351. 
49 Bill Tarry, “Building the NMIIC,” unclassified briefing to OPNAV, Pentagon, October 2004. 
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communications and liaison problems inherent in a purely military structure were 
significantly reduced; NMIC has a history of working with other agencies in compiling 
maritime intelligence. This liaison activity has increased significantly since 9/11 with an 
increased focus on maritime security and counter-terrorism on the strategic level. 
NMIC is particularly suited for strategic MDA in a number of respects.  
Employing a unique multi-agency approach to conduct worldwide civil-maritime 
analysis, NMIC increases its emphasis on HLD, standing up a dedicated watch floor with 
connectivity to various COCOMs and HLS agencies.  From the analytical perspective, 
ONI is the principal source for maritime intelligence on global merchant affairs and a 
national leader in other non-traditional maritime issues such as counter-narcotics, fishing 
issues, ocean dumping of radioactive waste, technology transfer, and counter-
proliferation.50 These programs have direct applicability to strategic MDA. Through a 
long-term, massive compilation of data obtained from a variety of sources (much of 
which is commercially available), NMIC uses its Global Trader database system to 
baseline normalcy in the merchant shipping worldwide, enabling it to detect anomalies,51 
perform pattern matching on illicit activity, and alert to high interest profiles.52  Analysts 
are employed who possess merchant marine background to provide a civilian perspective 
on merchant activity, as well as port and customs experts in addition to regular Navy and 
Coast Guard personnel. 
Analysts at NMIC focus on “white” (non-military) shipping, cargo-container 
movement, and international port activity.  In analyzing the entire transshipment process, 
they have been successful in obtaining information on roughly 40% of all containerized 
 
50 Office of Naval Intelligence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/intro.htm. (accessed September 30, 
2005) 
51 “Anomalies” in the military context requires some explanation.  Most vessels in a naval COP are 
not tracked continuously unless there is some reason to suspect illicit activity—the track is required to be 
‘updated’ over several hours, or, as seen in the MDIZ example, verified with increasing frequency as the 
vessel approaches the U.S. coastline.  This verification is usually done with some form of active or passive 
sensor.  Between verification, however, the vessel’s position is assumed using its last known course and 
speed.  Obviously if the vessel changes course, the estimated position will not be accurate during the next 
tracking verification, creating an uncertainty or anomaly.  This can also be applied in analysis.  If, for 
example, a vessel with a known history of carrying one type of cargo on a set route suddenly changes its 
manifest or destination, this could be seen as an anomaly worthy of further investigation. 
52 Wendy Kay, NMIC brief to author, Suitland MD, 9 March 2004. 
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cargo worldwide.53  Additionally, through a number of international agreements with 
inter-model shipping agencies, open source data is collected on most of the major ports 
and maritime transshipment points worldwide.  This data is used not only to detect 
anomalies, but also to address seams between the different modes of transportation from 
an all-domain viewpoint.  NMIC maintains active liaison with Customs efforts in 
executing the Container Security Initiative (CSI), sharing appropriate data to improve 
security for containerized cargo. 
Prior to 9/11 NMIC was generally recognized as one of the premier centers for 
strategic maritime intelligence.  For purposes of MDA, however, several key elements 
are missing that are required to meld it into the developing MDA infrastructure as the 
focal point for strategic MDA. The first is a formal recognition that NMIC should fulfill 
this role.  Today many agencies maintain independent strategic intelligence centers with 
limited ties to NMIC, effectively stove piping their strategic intelligence54.  Unlike 
JHOCs and MIFCs, the inter-agency integration at the strategic level is not nearly as well 
developed as that employed at local or regional levels, where often cooperation is based 
on local relationships or a shared operational area.  Recognition of NMIC as the strategic 
center for MDA will require the establishment of formal liaison billets and links to other 
agencies at the highest level of government.  The recent reorganization of the intelligence 
community and the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) can serve 
as a model for the new NMIC to follow for MDA.55 
Second, NMIC must be linked via an active COP or dedicated link to JHOCs, 
MIFCs, and DOD combatant commanders.  This exists to a large extent in its legacy 
support to Navy and Coast Guard COCOMs via an active watch and operations center 
 
53 Wendy Kay, NMIC brief to author, 9 March 2004. 
54 The most detailed public examination of stove piping and other harmful intelligence practices prior 
to 9/11 are stated in The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), Chapter 11 “Foresight 
and Hindsight,” particularly sections 11.3-11.4. 
55 The creation of the Director of National Intelligence is one of the most sweeping Intelligence 
reorganizations since the National Security Act of 1947.  See “White House National Intelligence Director 
Press Briefing,” (www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/2004082-6.html, August 2, 2004, accessed 
February 26, 2005) 
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that monitors fleet activity for both Services.56  This link needs to be strengthened, 
focusing on direct inter-action with JHOCs, and MIFCs, using multi-agency liaisons to 
analyze the data flowing from these sources for strategic MDA. Such a COP will allow 
MDA information to flow unimpeded to the strategic level for analysis, while 
subsequently allowing information and analysis to flow directly back down the chain. 
The new NMIC would have a number of distinct roles and responsibilities in the 
MDA realm. This includes long term analysis to identify potential enemy trends in the 
maritime domain, and providing Indication and Warning analysis (I&W) by piecing 
together indicators that may identify potential terrorist action/attack.  This information 
would be translated into actionable intelligence that can be inputted to the COP for 
immediate dissemination to the MDA operational and tactical levels and applicable 
COCOMs and agencies.  In addition to its I&W responsibilities, information fusion and 
integration at NMIC allows for true compilation of maritime data that is vital for strategic 
planning, including generation of worldwide shipping lists, potential overseas cargo 
tracking and trends, WMD and counter-proliferation studies, port vulnerability analysis, 
and other long-term analytical studies that provide critical background for operational 
planners.  As part of the MDA infrastructure, this information would flow freely in a 
cyclical manner between regional and tactical levels via the COP. 
 
 






Figure 6.   Current Infrastructure Model 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the full Current Infrastructure Model on the Tactical, Regional, and 
Strategic levels.  Note that although there is some degree of hierarchy in these 
relationships, they are intended to be fully cyclical.  Information is shared via the COP 
between organizations at each level.  In other words, there is no senior-subordinate 
relationship between the groups; information flows freely and is used by respective 
analysts to focus on their areas of expertise. 
 
 
Legacy systems at NMIC provide a final key component of strategic MDA that 
make it truly global in perspective.  Through its fleet support, NMIC exercises a link to 
dedicated overseas elements that can contribute to the strategic picture through robust and 
active surveillance.  For purposes of the MDA model, this can be improved in a number 
of ways.  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Customs established a number of overseas 
positions for shipping agents to perform cargo checks on containers bound for the United 
States.  This program has direct applicability to the cargo analysis element of MDA.  
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Linking cargo information to NMIC for analytical purposes would be of enormous 
benefit to strategic MDA.57  Operationally, deploying Navy battle groups maintain a 
robust surveillance capability during their transit to operations areas and while on station, 
providing this information to the Navy’s global COP.  Possessing organic sensors that 
can be tasked to look at specific areas or threat, and maintaining active intelligence links, 
Navy battle groups can act as “deployable MIFCs” vis a vis MDA, providing overseas 
information that can be extremely valuable to strategic analysis conducted at NMIC.  
This mobility and the ability to conduct surveillance at various straits and chokepoints 
can make a key contribution to the MDA COP, especially if intelligence indicates 
potential “hot spots” of maritime threat activity. 
No discussion of global MDA would be complete without consideration of 
National Assets that can be fused into the strategic picture maintained at NMIC.  The 
United States maintains two distinct forms of sensors that have particular applicability to 
MDA: a robust satellite capability maintained by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Integrated Underwater Surveillance 
System (IUSS).58  Developed during the Cold War, these systems offer superior 
capability for ocean surveillance, enabling in-depth analysis and I&W by NMIC.  While 
specific capability is classified, both NSA and NRO have become full partners in the 
MDA effort, and are currently studying methods by which these systems can be re-tasked 
from examining a strictly military/Cold War threat to a broader application for use in 
MDA.  This is possible through linkage with NMIC, which already has a long established 
history in liaison with these commands and background in analyzing data provided from 
national assets.59 
 
57 Cargo and container analysis is actually far more complex than simple inspection; at present, CBP 
uses a number of computer programs in conjunction with inspectors to check for anomalies much in the 
same way vessel tracking systems are employed.  These programs are part of the broader Container 
Security Initiative (CSI).  See www.cbp.gov/xp/border_security/international_activities/csi. (accessed 
September 25, 2005). 
58 The capabilities of these systems are highly classified and beyond the scope of this thesis.  For an 
unclassified overview, see www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/iuss.htm. (accessed March 19, 2005) 
59 Wendy Kay, NMIC brief, 9 March 2004. 
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An expansion of NMIC to focus on strategic integration would place the facility 
as the lead strategic component of MDA that has uses in the national arena in established 
areas of counter-terrorism and homeland defense. This inter-governmental integration 
also creates a centralized location for maritime intelligence that can be used by other 
commands and agencies (for example, the National Counter Terrorism Center and 
NORTHCOM) to meet their maritime intelligence requirements for GWOT and 
Homeland Defense.  By enhancing the established facility with inter-agency liaison 
positions and creating a global COP, NMIC can effectively bridge the gap between 
homeland security, Department of Defense, and National Intelligence agencies with a 
vested interest in both HLS and HLD. 
 
D. SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL 
MDA is about information, and as we enter the high tech world of the 21st century 
it is apparent that information is available in abundance.  At no time in history has so 
much information been available to operational commanders, but conversely, the huge 
amount of data that must be considered in the maritime domain often threatens to 
overwhelm traditional military and civilian analysts.  This is the great paradox of our 
time.  As the 9/11 report aptly stated, to be truly effective we must not focus on 
collection, but rather devise an effective method to sort the wheat from the chaff, to bring 
together these vast sources of information in one coherent picture to determine what is 
applicable to homeland security and homeland defense.60 
The Current Infrastructure Model capitalizes on infrastructure and expertise 
traditional organizations had prior to 9/11 fused with new structures put in place to deal 
with the new asymmetric threat.  As we have seen, much of the work has already been 
accomplished, either through the creation of new command structures (JHOCs and 
MIFCs) or by intelligence organizations re-focusing their efforts on maritime homeland 
security (NMIC).  By refocusing the “best of breed” multi-agency group in each level of 
warfare—tactical, regional/operational and strategic—toward the common goal of MDA, 
by linking what we already have through shared situational awareness and by dedicated 
 
60 The 9/11 Commission Report, 399-428. 
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analytical effort, we can achieve MDA at a minimum of cost and maximum efficiency.  
By making this an inter-agency effort using established Coast Guard (DHS) and Navy 
(DOD) components, the legal barriers currently in place regarding information exchange 
can be addressed.61 
Implementing MDA by employing the Current Infrastructure model of linking 
JHOCs, MIFCs, and NMIC offers a number of unique advantages: 
--Employs a natural multi-agency approach by fusing intelligence at the three 
respective levels (tactical/operational/strategic) 
--Approaches MDA as an information system to enable current operations, not a 
system designed to drive operations 
--Does not require a command element; rather, emphasizes that information is 
available for all to use and is therefore a force multiplier vice a driver. 
--Employs current infrastructure with minor modifications making it cost 




61 See Appendix 2. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE MDA MODELS 
While MDA is not new, it is an evolving concept and far reaching in its scope and 
vision.  The idea of a unifying system of fused multi-agency information is entirely new 
to both DOD and DHS, and as such has been subject to a great deal of debate.  This is 
especially true regarding the final form that MDA will take upon implementation.  MDA 
cannot just “happen” on its own; clearly there must some form of construct and oversight 
to ensure its success.  But the final forms this can take vary considerably.  On one end of 
the spectrum, the Current Infrastructure model describes a construct that shares 
information with a minimum degree of command and control, focusing on the linkage of 
established infrastructure toward the common goal of MDA.  On the other, arguments 
have been made that given the diverse and multi-agency nature of MDA, a more rigid 
command and control structure is required.62  This could take the form of establishing a 
formal command to focus specifically on MDA, controlling various operational assets to 
achieve multi-agency awareness.  The idea of creating new commands to specialize in a 
particular region or operational area of expertise is not new; DOD has been using the 
Joint Task Force (JTF) concept in this regard since the 1980s.  But JTFs are intended—in 
theory—to be narrowly focused and above all temporary.  The command models expand 
on this concept to argue for a permanent state, one strategic entity that effectively 
controls all elements of MDA. 
Two models figured prominently in the command debate.  Since MDA is a 
relatively new, multi-agency concept, these models focus on a structure that would bring 
various agencies together under one form of new command that would ensure the 
implementation and continued exercise of MDA.  The first, the creation of a “Maritime 
NORAD” calls for a structure similar to that used to protect the air approaches to the 
United States, while the second, a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) relies on a joint 
model that became popular in the 1980s.  Interestingly, both models are based heavily on 
historical successes in other domains.  Created in 1958, NORAD is a well designed and 
 
62 Donna Miles, “Planning Group Weighs Value of ‘Maritime NORAD,’”  Armed Forces Info Service, 
Defense Link News, 17 May 2005. 
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coordinated air defense entity whose construct and procedures, advocates argue, could 
easily be adapted to the maritime domain.  The JIATF model is borrowed heavily from 
the multi-agency counter-narcotics command created in 1989 to focus on DOD 
involvement in countering drug trafficking.  Proponents of this model argue that a 
“JIATF MDA” could, in theory, expand efforts from counter-narcotics to all activities in 
the maritime domain.  The strengths—and weaknesses—of these models will now be 
examined in turn. 
 
A. MARITIME NORAD  
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is seen by many—
including the former Chief of Naval Operations--as an effective model for maritime 
defense.63  There are good reasons for this.  Formed in 1958 as a multi-national 
organization to defend North American airspace, NORAD was the first command to deal 
specifically with defense in one strategic domain, utilizing a vast array of extremely 
technical assets to perform its mission.  NORAD has vast experience in fusing highly 
technical means, national assets, and other information sources into one comprehensive 
surveillance system that has been extremely effective in monitoring and responding to 
potential air threats to the United States.  NORAD is unique in its mission and extensive 
capability, effectively coordinating strategic and tactical operations in one domain.  It’s 
ability to effectively monitor one domain and respond quickly to a perceived threat either 
globally or regionally make NORAD a very attractive command and control construct for 
a similar MDA organization.  Moreover, NORAD is both bi-national and multi-agency, 
elements required in any final form of MDA.  Given the similarities between the 
capabilities of NORAD and the requirements of MDA, it would seem that replicating this 
model in the maritime arena is a logical choice to implement MDA. 
While it is true that NORAD’s success in the air domain make it an attractive 
alternate model for MDA, there are several immediate problems adapting its structure to 
the maritime domain.  NORAD is a purely reactive command, intended as a defensive 
model.  Due to its global nature and the need to seek out all information relevant to the 
 
63 Robert Ackerman, “Pace of Change Accelerates for U.S. Navy,” Signal Magazine, December 2004. 
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maritime domain, MDA is not a defensive organization, but rather a concept focused on 
aggressive collection and analysis.  Vessel tracking is a key component of MDA, but as 
we have seen MDA is ultimately an information system that attempts to fuse all of the 
elements of interest that touch the maritime domain, such as cargo anomaly detection, 
tracking of suspect personnel, determining vessel links to terrorism, and a myriad of other 
intelligence or informational components.  The NORAD model does not emphasize long 
term analysis of these factors per se, rather focusing on the detection, tracking, and 
interception of established threats.  Much of the information that is so crucial to the 
success of MDA is non-traditional, non-military, and multi-agency in nature, and as such 
is generally is not available to traditional military commands.  The requirement to 
correlate this wide ranging type of information for an effective tactical and strategic 
picture is far more detailed than that addressed by the NORAD model. 
The global nature of MDA also presents difficulty when considering the NORAD 
construct.  NORAD was designed to focus strictly on the North American area of 
responsibility (AOR), and as such is partnered with Canada in a bi-national effort.  The 
implementation of a “maritime NORAD” also implies this North American centric 
viewpoint, which will present diplomatic problems in partnering with other nations, 
notably Mexico which has repeatedly indicated it will not participate in a defensive type 
organization.64  A distinct militarization of MDA as a NORAD has the potential to create 
similar reactions from other international partners that are crucial to effective MDA 
execution. 
Arguably these difficulties can be overcome.  No one is saying the actual 
command and control structure used by NORAD should be moved directly into the 
maritime domain.  The idea of a maritime NORAD is largely conceptual, but as an actual 
command structure would be in place to conduct maritime surveillance operations, it is 
logical to assume that this role would be assigned to Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), the DOD command charted with coordinating homeland defense in the 
 
64 Lawrence Spinetta, “Expanding NORAD: A Strategy to Engage Mexico.” Air Power International, 
24 June 2004.  www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. (accessed April 30, 2005). 
 44
                                                
continental United States.65  DOD created NORTHCOM to coordinate Pentagon 
homeland defense efforts and allocate military support to civil authorities.66  In this role, 
if there were to be a formal “Maritime NORAD,” it would seem that NORTHCOM 
would be the logical place for such a command to be created. 
As DOD’s primary HLD command, NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility 
includes defense of the continental United States (including Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the 
USVI) and the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean within approximately 500 miles of the United 
States.67 Physically co-located with NORAD, NORTHCOM’s over 1200 personnel are 
drawn from all Services in DOD and include representatives from the Coast Guard and 
other multi-agency liaisons. Representing one of the largest military reorganizations since 
the Second World War, NORTHCOM’s responsibilities include not only homeland 
defense, but also focus on Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA) for 
consequence management.  This is a tremendous degree of responsibility and requires 
considerable diversity in operational expertise. 
NORTHCOM’s mission focus makes its use as a maritime NORAD problematic.  
As a DOD Combatant Commander (COCOM), NORTHCOM’s primary responsibility is 
HLD, not HLS.  In the inter-agency construct, this is a far bigger legal and policy issue 
than one might imagine.  As previously discussed, HLS is primarily a law enforcement 
mission involving non-DOD agencies.68  While it is true that NORTHCOM has 
established liaison with many civilian agencies for HLS and MACV operations, the scope 
of MDA would require a huge expansion of these relationships.  Moreover, unlike the 
Current Infrastructure model, the NORAD construct implies command, not cooperation.  
Many of the agencies that operate under the DHS umbrella that are potential 
 
65 Note that NORTHCOM is only one proposal as to the final form of a maritime NORAD. The idea 
that NORTHCOM should take the role of Maritime NORAD, however, has been proposed a number of 
times within DOD.  While there are other candidates, the author concedes that this is the logical choice for 
such a command given proposed structure of a maritime NORAD and the fact that NORTHCOM is 
currently in place and located with the current NORAD.  If we were to have a NORAD-like command, 
NORTHCOM is the logical choice. 
66 Jason Sherman, “Domain Defense,” Sea Power, http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power, May 2004, 
(accessed February 26, 2005). 
67 NORTHCOM Strategic Vision, 4. 
68 See Appendix 1. 
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users/contributors to MDA would have a difficult time operating under a military 
command structure that is completely foreign, in addition to a host of legal issues that 
could arise from such an arrangement.69  Finally, NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility 
both geographically and operationally is also extremely large.  Taking on the 
considerable responsibility of also acting as a maritime NORAD would require 
considerable refocus, including a massive influx of personnel and equipment to tailor the 
command to the new maritime mission in both its HLD role and to meet the strategic 
world-wide information gathering requirements of MDA. 
 
B. JIATF 
A Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) model differs from the maritime 
NORAD construct in several key areas.  The JIATF construct was designed for and has 
been used successfully in the counter-narcotics arena since the early 1990s.  Although a 
military command, JIATF is far more specialized than standard JTFs and intended from 
its onset to be a multi-agency organization.  JIATF is extremely focused on one particular 
mission area, fusing various intelligence and operational components from both DOD and 
law enforcement toward that mission.  The original intent of JIATF was to use the DOD 
intelligence to detect and monitor air and maritime narco-trafficing, passing this 
information to appropriate law enforcement activity for action once the threat had been 
properly localized.  The model used for MDA is based on the current counter-drug 
organization, JIATF SOUTH. 
JIATF SOUTH’s official mission statement is to “conduct counter illicit 
trafficking operations, intelligence fusion and multi-sensor correlation to detect, monitor, 
and handoff suspected illicit trafficking targets; promotes security cooperation and 
coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit 
 
69 See Appendix 2. 
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traffic.”70  Officially created by Presidential Decision Directive 14 in 1989, the JIATF 
construct was in direct response to President Reagan’s decision that drug smuggling 
represented a clear and present danger to the United States and as such was subject to 
action by DOD vice traditional law enforcement.71  As a DOD entity, JIATF’s mission 
was limited strictly to detection and monitoring of suspected drug trafficking.  Actual 
seizure was conducted by units under the tactical control of the Coast Guard.  This legal 
nicety allowed for the use of considerable DOD surveillance assets while avoiding actual 
combat under DOD per se.  As such, JIATF proved to be the first (and arguably most 
successful) merger of military and law enforcement capability to meet a common threat. 
The unique advantage of the JIATF model is its interagency construct designed to 
fuse intelligence and operations.  Representatives from the Department of Defense, 
Department of Homeland Security (Coast Guard, formally under DOT), and Department 
of the Treasury (Customs) work side by side with representatives from the DEA, FBI, 
DIA, and NCIS.  In addition, JIATF utilizes effective international liaison with Great 
Britain, France, Canada and the Netherlands who provide ships, aircraft and liaison 
officers.  A recent development is the inclusion of liaison officers from Argentina, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, all of which have a vested interest in stopping 
the maritime drug trade.72 
Given its unique multi-agency intelligence and operational construct, as well as its 
noted success in fusing intelligence that can be used by all participants, it would seem 
that the JIATF construct would be perfect for an MDA command and control construct.  
Culturally, the formation of JTFs to deal with specific military threats is an established 
military procedure, and there is no questioning the success of JIATF in the counter-
 
70 www.jiatf.southcom.mil. (accessed January 8, 2005) Note that “JIATF SOUTH” is a relatively new 
command designation.  Originally designated JTF 4, the JIATF mission evolved into two separate 
commands based on geographic areas of responsibility; JIATF EAST covered drug traffic in the 
Atlantic/Caribbean, while JIATF WEST focused on the Pacific.  In 2002 a reorganization occurred due to 
shifting trafficking emphasis; the newly designated JIATF SOUTH focused on the Caribbean/Eastern 
Pacific, while JIATF WEST focused on the western Pacific.  For purposes of this discussion, the lessons 
learned/operational description will be taken from historical efforts in the Caribbean as this is the highest 
area of trafficking and JIATF operations. 
71www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jitf.htm. (accessed January 8, 2005). 
72 www.globalsecurity.org. (accessed January 8, 2005). 
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narcotics mission.  These factors were subject to considerable debate in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 and a large war gaming effort gave considerable weight to the argument 
to form a new JIATF focused purely on MDA.  
The JIATF model, however, has two primary weaknesses as a construct for MDA.  
The degree of effort and scope required to achieve MDA, and JIATF’s relationship to 
operational forces are challenges to the JIATF model.  As we have seen, MDA is an all-
encompassing global information system of considerable scope, requiring a strategic 
viewpoint vice operational.  It must be recalled that JIATF was formed to perform a 
limited mission against a very specific threat in a relatively limited operational area.  The 
specialists at JIATF use surveillance, intelligence, and analysis against maritime 
smuggling, which utilizes a very specific skill set. While JIATF is very good at detecting 
and tracking potential smugglers in its area of responsibility (in JIATF SOUTH’s case, 
the Caribbean), an expansion to cover all events in the maritime domain is another 
matter.  Like a maritime NORAD, such an expansion would require a massive influx of 
personnel whose expertise covers the full gamut of MDA.   
JIATF’s employment of operational assets is problematic when translating its 
construct to MDA.  Counter-narcotics is focused on detecting and tracking a known 
“enemy” threat—MDA, as an information system, is far less active or adversarial.  In the 
present state, JIATF actively employs military assets to search for, track, and intercept 
smugglers.  To perform this mission, assets (ships and aircraft) are “loaned” to JIATF 
from the respective services for patrol and intercept, much like any other COCOM 
dealing with a specific threat.  While actual numbers are classified, the forces assigned 
are relatively small as they are scaled to the operational area.  This issue of mission scale 
is significant when considering potential operational forces assigned to MDA.  While 
conducting surveillance and intercepting drug smugglers requires relatively few assets in 
the grand scheme of U.S. military force, actively dedicating assets to conduct global 
MDA using a JIATF construct would not.  Dedicating even a moderate number of assets 
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to MDA on a continuous basis would have a serious impact on overseas operations.73  
MDA’s global nature of MDA—awareness in every theatre, especially closing the 
coastline of the United States—also brings about potential conflicts with other 
established organizations as other military commands whose area of responsibility come 
into conflict with a JIATF MDA.  In theory, if MDA is in fact a state of situational 
awareness/information system, all maritime assets should be contributing to the 
information system.  If a JIATF is dedicated to MDA, would it take control of and direct 
assets that are, in fact, conducting essentially the same mission for another commander?74 
This potential conflict of interest violates the premise of unity of command, and 
represents tremendous potential for mismanagement of assets, conflicts, and turf battles.   
Finally, one must consider the tactical and legal implications of employing 
military assets in this manner.  In the early days of JIATF, a number of military assets 
were used to actively patrol various areas in the Caribbean in the effort to detect 
smugglers.  Tactically, this proved to be a misuse of assets as smugglers simply diverted 
around the established locations.75  Finally, the counter-narcotics JIATFs were 
designated (and limited) by specific legal authority to target a threat to national security. 
MDA, as an information system, enjoys no such authority.  Employing DOD assets to 
actively search and potentially board targets of interest without specific intelligence or 
established Title 14 authority is a difficult legal challenge that must be addressed by 
legislation if it is to be effective. 
 
73 Naval vessels go through a rigorous training cycle prior to overseas deployment, sometime in the 
order of 6 months of “workup” exercises, small local strike group exercises.  This is rigorously controlled 
by fleet commanders.  If a ship were taken out of this training cycle for patrol duty, it would take much 
longer to enable it to be fully trained for overseas duty.  Additionally, as there are a limited number of ships 
for overseas assignment, another ship would have to be rotated into the cycle early, creating either a 
training shortfall in that ship’s preparation or a delay in scheduled maintenance.  This has a considerable 
“snowball” effect on the overall system, creating significant gaps fleet wide.  Author’s operational 
experience. 
74 For example, if a Coast Guard cutter is performing an operational mission off the U.S. coastline 
under the operational control of the Coast Guard (and, in theory, conducting MDA in the process), would a 
JIATF suddenly “take control” of that asset for another MDA related mission?  This has the overall effect 
of operational assets working for “two bosses,” a very difficult and confusing operational problem. 
75 Author’s operational experience.  The “ship in a box” tactic, while effective in detecting strictly 
military threats to a strike group, is poorly adapted to law enforcement or surveillance operations.  As 
JIATF operations matured through experience, it was determined that active use of intelligence combined 
with the use of military assets was far more effective in counter-narcotics operations than simply assigning 
ships to patrol certain ocean areas. 
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Both the JIATF and the NORAD concepts differ from the Current Infrastructure 
Model in that proponents see the need for some directing force—a command—to ensure 
effective MDA.  The crux of the MDA command models is twofold: that information 
must be managed by a centralized authority to be effective, and that operational assets 
must be dedicated solely to the MDA mission.  These premises ignore the very nature of 
MDA.  In terms of information management, the global nature of MDA and the diversity 
of  knowledge and expertise required to make it effective is a direct counter to the 
centralization argument.  Collating this vast amount of information in one place would 
not only swiftly overwhelm a single command entity, but also significantly diffuse the 
tactical and operational levels that actually use MDA in their individual operating areas.  
In terms of operational direction of assets, ultimately MDA is not about directing ships 
and planes to chase down every potential unknown contact on a continuous basis, it’s 
about the effective use of sensors and information flow to provide operational 
commanders the intelligence to direct those assets. 
The Current Infrastructure Model addresses both issues by delegating MDA to 
appropriate levels of authority while focusing on a shared information network.  Current 
infrastructure argues that by its very nature MDA is best managed at the three respective 
levels of warfare—tactical, regional, and strategic—for information relative to the 
warfare area and using MDA as a force multiplier for operational units at those levels.  
Current infrastructure does not require the dedication of operational assets per se to the 
MDA mission, as it is assumed that MDA will become a mission subset of all fleet 
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V. SUMMARY 
The vulnerability of the maritime domain is one of the most serious security 
challenges facing this nation.  The United States’ reliance on the sea has not changed 
with the onset of the Global War on Terror.  If anything, this reliance has been increased 
by the demands of globalization and the increased requirement to rapidly deploy military 
force worldwide.  The tremendous diversity and complexity of the maritime domain and 
the potentially catastrophic effects of an enemy attack make its protection a top national 
priority.  Key to protecting the maritime domain is obtaining information vital for 
planning, multi-agency cooperation, and operational response. That is Maritime Domain 
Awareness’ role. 
MDA is extremely ambitious in scope, vision, and stated objectives.  As one of 
the largest security programs undertaken by the U.S. government, effective MDA will 
require considerable alignment among the 16 government agencies responsible for its 
implementation.  Much has been accomplished in establishing  policies and procedures 
for improving maritime security, but for MDA to be completely implemented, a new 
organizational structure will be required that considers execution on a national, regional, 
and tactical level.  The National Plan for MDA is the first step in achieving this goal, but 
it is only the beginning.  The details of how this plan will be implemented remain to be 
seen.  When examining our current capabilities, the use of current infrastructure will be 
the most efficient means to achieve this implementation. 
While the MDA program grew out of the vast governmental reorganization 
following 9/11, the concept itself is not new.  As part of core maritime law enforcement 
and military operations, the Coast Guard and Navy have always conducted some form of 
MDA geared toward their respective mission areas.  As such, much of the infrastructure, 
and procedures that were used prior to 9/11 are still in place, and can be effectively 
modified to meet the increased demands of a total maritime awareness system.  This is 
possible by considering infrastructure vis a vis the new requirements of MDA.  On the 
tactical level, the JHOC initiative shows great promise by fusing Coast Guard and Navy 
port operations with the myriad of regulatory and law enforcement agencies active in 
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ports, creating one common information system that can be used at a centralized location 
by all parties.  Regionally, the newly created MIFCs can link with JHOCs to provide 
analysis and disseminate critical information up the chain to strategic centers and back 
down to tactical users.  As an experienced national intelligence center, the NMIC can act 
in the strategic role fusing information from the tactical and regional levels, while 
providing a broader picture for long-term planning and global operations.  Through a 
dedicated virtual link, the combination of this infrastructure under the over-arching goal 
of MDA can be an effective and easily implemented solution to the post 9/11 maritime 
security challenge. 
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APPENDIX 1: HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND 
DEFENSE 
A. BACKGROUND: WHY TWO MISSIONS? 
While historically the military has always had a role in defending the homeland, 
these actions have generated deeply rooted concerns about the use of military force on 
U.S. soil.  The Posse Comitatus Act restricting domestic use of the military was written to 
reflect this viewpoint.  Although the military has been used in active defense during 
wartime, this has been against a direct and specific military threat (such as the U-boat 
attacks during the Second World War, and the formation of NORAD to defend against 
Soviet missile attack).  More recently military actions have moved beyond strictly 
conventional roles, supplementing certain “lower intensity” law enforcement style 
operations, such as providing surveillance and intercept capability in the Drug War and 
countering illegal immigration.76  Regardless of the success or increasing frequency of 
these operations, the military has moved cautiously.  The encroachment of the military 
into traditional law enforcement missions has moved slowly—if at all—and under 
extreme scrutiny by lawmakers and the public. 
This mindset changed after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent launch of the 
“Global War on Terror” (GWOT).  While it is true that Posse Comitatus remained 
unchanged, the direct attack on the United States and subsequent GWOT placed the 
military on a war footing.  Despite its offensive, overseas nature, the overriding priority 
in GWOT is protection of the homeland, a mission assigned top priority by the military.  
Yet determining how the military is to accomplish this mission has proved challenging.  
In the immediate aftermath of the mobilization following 9/11, no additional threat 
materialized in the homeland, leaving the DOD’s contributions to homeland defense 
unclear.  It was immediately apparent that the nature of this new war presented several 
unique challenges.  Although terrorists are armed enemies, their ability to hide and 
operate domestically placed many of their acts solidly in the realm of law enforcement, 
 
76 Recent expansion into LE operations, notably in the “Drug War” were enacted during the Reagan 
administration which broadly defined national security threats that were valid targets for the military.. 
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which is, admittedly, far better trained and equipped than the military for lengthy 
investigation and apprehension.  But unlike those who have committed previous terrorist 
acts on U.S. soil, Al Qaida are outfitted and trained outside of U.S. borders specifically to 
conduct “warfare” against the United States, arguably making them combatants.  Clearly, 
both domestic law enforcement and the military have parts to play in this new war.  “War 
winning” is not confined to the military alone. 
The recognition of this new element in warfare and the differences between law 
enforcement and military action resulted in the creation of the respective missions of 
Homeland Security and Homeland Defense.  In their strategies DHS and DoD define 
these missions as:   
Homeland security (HLS) is. . . “a concerted national effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability 
to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal 




Homeland defense (HLD is. . .the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, 
domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external 
threats and aggression. The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible 
for homeland defense78 
Further quantifying these definitions, it would be fair to say that HLS is confined 
to the realm of law enforcement (with possible DoD assistance), while HLD is a DoD 
mission employing military assets. 
The intent in creating separate mission areas is twofold.  In defining separate 
missions we have neatly aligned our cultural tradition of separation of civil and military 
authorities, while assigning responsibility for counter-terrorism where appropriate.  This 
places the agencies in their respective “boxes” where they can apply their individual 
capabilities and expertise in the most efficient manner.  Additionally, one must consider 
 
77 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2. 
78 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 10. 
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that separation of missions into HLS and HLD allow for considerable law enforcement 
assets (and perhaps more importantly, expertise) to be brought to bear on a security 
problem where a strict application of military force is not appropriate (and may be, in 
fact, counter-productive). 
Although defined, there has been much speculation as to what exactly constitutes 
an HLS and HLD event and, more importantly, when the “line” is crossed.  In making 
this determination, a number of guidelines are employed: 
1. Almost all security threats begin in the HLS realm.  This is due to the fact 
that most events are usually nebulous or uncertain at the outset, requiring some degree of 
investigation.  There are two exceptions to this: 
a. The threat is a known WMD.  In this particular case, it is usual to define 
the event as HLD and military action is taken. 
b. The threat is airborne.  To date, DHS has no air intercept capability, so 
these threats are classified as HLD as a responsibility of NORAD. 
 
2. Although an event may be classified as HLS or HLD, this does not mean 
that forces from DHS or DoD act in a vacuum.  In the maritime arena, a number of 
Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) exist between Coast Guard and Navy to allow for 
“chop” (assignment) of forces to each respective Service if the need arises.  If, for 
example, the Coast Guard is attempting to locate a suspect vessel under HLS and requires 
assistance, it can request ships and aircraft from the Navy to assist in that search (the 
assets temporarily becoming part of the Coast Guard.)  Similarly, in an HLD event the 
Navy may require the unique boarding capability possessed by the Coast Guard, and can 
request assets to perform that mission under Navy control for HLD. 
 
3. DHS and DoD share information at the highest levels during developing 
HLS/HLD events.  If the event shows signs of escalating to HLD (i.e., presence of WMD 
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or clear terrorist threat the HLS cannot meet), the decision to escalate to HLD is made by 
the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense in consultation with the President. 




APPENDIX 2: MDA LEGAL BRIEF 
MDA represents unprecedented cooperation between government agencies and as 
such is subject to a number of legal issues and concerns, particularly regarding the use of 
DHS and DoD assets and personnel operating together in information gathering and law 
enforcement.  MDA planning is subject to extensive legal review by both DHS and DoD 
to ensure the spirit and letter of the law are followed in its execution.  It is important in 
examining MDA initiatives to be cognizant of the pertinent laws that apply in this review. 
Title Authority:  Forces participating in MDA operate under three specific 
government titles: 
a. Title 10: Title 10 applies to issues of authority and command and control 
for the Department of Defense.  While operating under Title 10, the military works 
directly for the Commander in Chief and cannot participate in domestic law enforcement. 
b. Title 14:  Title 14 applies to the Coast Guard and designates that Service 
as a maritime law enforcement agency.  It is important to note that the Coast Guard can 
also operate under Title 10 for military operations. 
c. Title 32: Title 32 applies to the National Guard.  While operating under 
Title 32 the National Guard works directly for the Governor (or Adjutant General) of its 
assigned state and may be used  in traditional law enforcement.79 
Posse Comitatus:  Drafted in 1878 to limit the use of the Army in the 
reconstructionist South, Posse Comitatus (PC) was designed to remove the Army from 
domestic law enforcement and enforcement of politically volatile Reconstruction Era 
policies.80  Since 1878 the underlying principles of Posse Comitatus have expanded to 
include all Services operating under DOD.  While this act is largely misunderstood 
(among other common misperceptions, many feel it is a constitutional mandate vice 
                                                 
79  Alan D. Preisser, “Understanding Authorities in National Special Security Events”  in Joint Center 
for Lessons Learned Bulletin, (Suffolk VA: Joint Warfighting Center, September/December 2002), 1. 
80 For excellent background, see Major Craig Trilbecock, “The Myth of Posse Comitatus,” Journal of 
Homeland Security (Oct. 2000). 
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statutory law), its fundamental premise continues to be generally reflective of the 
attitudes of the vast majority of U.S. citizens. 
Posse Comitatus means that Title 10 forces cannot be used in active law 
enforcement (interpreted as actions that would normally require a warrant, such as search 
and seizure).  The courts have held, however, that Title 10 forces can be used in 
“passive” law enforcement, such as planning and preparation of law enforcement 
activities to assist the local and federal law enforcement agencies.81  Additionally, PC 
does not apply when the President or Congress expressly authorize the use of the military 
to execute the law.  This includes giving the Coast Guard civilian law enforcement 
authority, calling out the military in times of insurrection and domestic violence (under 
the Insurrection Act), and enacting general legislation authorizing the armed forces to 
share information and equipment with civilian law enforcement agencies (10 USC 371-
382).82 
Intelligence Support:  U.S. Intelligence activities are subject to Executive Order 
12333.  EO 12333 was written as a result of intelligence abuses during the latter days of 
the Vietnam War protest movement, when DoD personnel were used to infiltrate and 
collect intelligence on dissidents.  EO 12333 prescribes specific guidelines for 
intelligence collection for all government agencies.  As related to MDA and the use of 
DoD/CIA intelligence sharing, the EO 12333 specifically states that Agencies with the 
Intelligence Community are authorized to:  
 
(a) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the 
purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and 
facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community; 
 
(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in 
law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine 
intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist 
or narcotics activities; 
                                                 
81 Preisser, 2. 
82 Jennifer Elsea, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch,” CRS Report for 
Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 6 June 2005), 2. 
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(c) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or 
assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or 
agency, or, when lives are endangered, to support local law 
enforcement agencies.  Provision of assistance by expert personnel 
shall be approved in each case by the General Counsel of the 
providing agency; and 
 
(d) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law 
enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable law.83 
 
As a general rule, raw data collected by DoD (primarily information that is 
publicly available) on U.S. persons may be shared with law enforcement but analyzed 
data may not.  DoD may not engage in electronic or physical surveillance of U.S. citizens 
within the United States without permission from a FISA court. 
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